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University of Macedonia, Greece 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The mobile telephony market is a very competitive market. Mobile telephony companies try to expand by 
forming strategic alliances with companies from various industries. The objective of this paper is to 
analyze the motives, the actions and the results of the collaborations and alliances of two Greek mobile 
telephony companies (Cosmote and Vodafone Hellas). In addition, this paper illustrates examples of how 
the technology change and the technological convergence (Internet, computers, and mobile telephony) 
affected and activated the proliferation of these alliances. The entry of I-mode and Vodafone Live! in the 
Greek market caused an increase in the number of alliances especially with content aggregators and 
media companies. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last decade, strategic alliances have experienced a tremendous growth. Specifically, telecommunications 
companies have exploited strategic alliances to achieve competitive advantage and handle the organizational and 
technological complexities of the global market.  
  
 In Greece, the mobile telecommunication sector is a quite competitive market. Cosmote and Vodafone Hellas are 
the mobile operators with the largest Greek market share. During the last years, each company has formed a 
significant number of alliances. This paper investigates the reasons for this alliance’s booming. It shows that the 
technology evolution (from 2G to 2.5G or to 3G), the convergence of mobile telephony with Internet and computers, 
together with the globalization drove Vodafone Hellas and Cosmote to large numbers of alliances with content 
aggregators, media companies, equipment manufacturers, Internet service providers, computer and software 
companies. 
 
Both companies formed their alliances in order to support their innovative products “i-mode” and “Vodafone Live!”. 
After a major alliance with the Japanese NTTDoCoMo, Cosmote concentrated its efforts in enriching i-mode’s 
content. Similarly, Vodafone Hellas’ intention was the successful deployment of Vodafone Live! into the Greek 
market.   
  
 In this paper we present Cosmote’s and Vodafone’s alliance partners and we examine the motives for each alliance 
and the resources contributed by each alliance partner. Finally, we show the necessity and emergency of proper 
alliance formations for a mobile company, in order to survive and to further grow in the continuously changeable 
mobile telecommunications sector. 
 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
 
Strategic alliances are formed when two or more companies agree to collaborate with each other on some domain, 
from the common manufacturing to the risky Research and Development domain. By linking the specific assets and 
facets of two or more businesses, a strategic alliance is able to provide a “trading partnership that enhances the 
effectiveness of the competitive strategies of the participating firms by providing mutually beneficial trade in 
technology, skills and/or products” (Yoshino & Rangan, 1995). Companies establish alliances in order to achieve 
their goals based on cooperation with appropriate partners. Furthermore, companies ally in order to stretch their 
boundaries, gain access to critical resources, restructure their capabilities and accumulate resources, experience and 
knowledge (Kogut, 1988). In a broad interpretation, strategic alliances are agreements between companies that 
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remain independent while often they are in competition. Yoshino and Rangan (1995) have referred three common 
characteristics of alliances: 
 
• The partnering companies continue to remain independent even after the formation of the alliance. 
• The partners allocate responsibility for the conduct and performance of specific sets of tasks and are then 
able to jointly share the benefits.  
• The partners contribute on an ongoing basis, using their own resources and capabilities for the development 
of one or more areas of the alliance (important for them). This could be technology, marketing, production, 
R&D or other areas. 
 
A crucial point of the strategic alliances is their ability to temper the vagaries of the competitive market for 
collective gain; they form a type of “organized competition”. Despite the fact that acquisitions and mergers are still 
some popular strategic movements of achieving competitive advantage, more and more companies choose to make 
strategic alliances which will allow them to handle the emerging organizational and technological changes in the 
global market. Companies usually prefer to form strategic alliances under the following conditions (Pellicelli, 2003): 
 
• When each partner recognizes the need to have access to capabilities and competencies it cannot develop 
internally. 
• When a gradual approach is preferable in accessing resources, capabilities and competencies. Uncertainties 
about the future evolution of demand and technology often advise flexibility. The alliance can provide this. 
• When the acquisition of another company is not a possibility in achieving particular development goals.  
 
So, alliances will help them to get access to the complementary resources of their partners and will further enhance 
their competitive position into the market. The potential of a proper alliances’ strategy is enormous. If it is 
implemented correctly it can dramatically improve the company’s operations and competitiveness (Brucellaria, 
1997). Each company builds its strategic alliances considering its present and future needs, its position into the 
market, its technological capabilities and also taking into account the size and the capabilities of the partner 
company. According to Hill and Jones (1999), the right partner in an alliance must have three principal features.  
 
• The partner must have the resources and capabilities to help the company achieve its strategic goals. It must 
bring to the alliance what the company is missing (access to a market or technology or share of the risk). 
• The partner must share its long-term goals for the alliance. Failure is inevitable if the goals are divergent.  
• The partner must not use the alliance to appropriate know-how, relationships with clients or suppliers or 
technology without making contributions of equal strategic weight.  
 
Forming strategic alliances can be an effective way to diffuse new technologies rapidly, to enter a new market, to 
bypass governmental restrictions expeditiously, and to learn quickly from the leading firms in a given field (Elmuti 
& Kathawala, 2001). Chief executive officers are increasingly turning to alliances as a way to grow their business 
and maximize shareholder value. However, researches found that more than half of all alliances fall well short of 
expectations (Park & Ungson, 2001; Zinedlin & Dodourova, 2005). This happens because alliances are different 
from other structural transactions, such as mergers or acquisitions, and they need to be managed differently. 
Alliances are an ongoing activity, messier to manage and somewhat open-ended in terms of their duration and focus. 
Often, strategic and managerial motivations are more important than financial and technological motivations 
(Zinedlin & Dodourova, 2005). In order to form successful alliances, companies should consider the following 
(Anslinger &  Jenk, 2004): 
 
• Develop clear, common objectives and definition of success. 
• Ensure proper alliance form. 
• Determine appropriate governance model with clear decision-making. 
• Anticipate the most likely conflicts. 
• Plan for evolution. 
• Establish clear metrics to track and measure success. 
 
Pekar (1996) and Hagedoorn (1990) pointed out the more common kinds of alliances:  
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• Collaborative advertising.  
• R&D partnerships. 
• University-based cooperative research. 
• Lease service agreements. 
• Shared-distribution. 
• Technology transfer.  
• Co-operative budging.  
• Cross-manufacturing.  
• Resource venturing.  
• Government and industry partnering. 
• Internal spin-offs.  
• Cross-licensing.  
• Customer-supplier agreements.  
 
There are many classifications of the alliances according to the motives, the resources, the structure or the direction. 
Here, we refer the most common ones (Yasuda, 2003), depending on the nature of the exchanged resources. Two 
dimensions are considered: 
 
1) Vertical – Horizontal alliances, and 
2) Symmetrical – Asymmetrical alliances. 
 
In the vertical alliances, companies from different industrial sectors contribute in the development of a product or 
service. For example, a mobile company collaborates with a manufacturer to develop special mobile phones. 
Vertical alliances will probably dominate in markets where competition demands for cost leadership and product 
innovation. In the horizontal alliances, companies form alliances with partners in the same industry. For example, 
two mobile companies ally in order to expand their wireless networks. This kind of alliance appears mostly in 
mature industries where due to the market globalization there is an increasing competition.  
 
In the symmetrical alliances, the same type of management resources is exchanged. One of their major purposes 
would be to supplement the companies’ resources which are not sufficient to meet the required market size, by 
utilizing the same resources available from their partners. The alliance partners share the resources in order to 
achieve the common goal. In the asymmetrical alliances, different types of management resources are exchanged. 
These alliances aim to complement the firms’ resources with different resources available by their partners. An 
example of this is when a company contributes its management resources in Capital and Production while the other 
company contributes its available ones in Technology and Human Resources. 
 
THE TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR 
 
During the last two decades, the telecommunications sector has been one of the most dynamically growing sectors. 
The industry has progressively opened up to competition in all parts of the world, as new technologies such as 
Internet, electronic services, handheld devices and cellular networks finally converge and create a new reality where 
new opportunities for profit are emerged. Important characteristics of this industry include high costs, rapid 
technological advances, high obsolescence, and intense competition in most segments. The liberalization of 
telecommunications caused reduction of the conventional voice service fees for consumers. This resulted to a 
gradual decrease in the average revenue per user of contracted accounts and the shrinkage of the operators’ profits 
(Kuo & Yu, 2006). Open standards are encouraging innovation and lower prices, while deregulation has opened the 
entry of telecommunications companies into all segments of the market (Grover & Saeed, 2003; Rice & Galvin, 
2006). For example, the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) is a leading industry forum for generating market-driven 
specifications for interoperable mobile service enablers (e.g. mobile Web services, push-to-talk over cellular, 
presence) (Brenner, et al., 2005). This will facilitate global user adoption of advanced mobile multimedia services.  
 
 Globalization affects the nature of competition as well. Barriers to international commerce are falling. Although 
each country might only support one or two domestic telecommunications giants, a world market enables each giant 
to participate in a huge market. Marketing alliances between national telecommunications companies and 
international mergers and investments are evidence that a world telecommunications market is emerging (Strouse, 
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1999). For example, Ericsson and Nokia formed a dynamic alliance whose rationales changes over the industry life 
cycle of the product (Rice & Galvin, 2006). In addition, changing demographics are affecting telecommunications 
markets in many ways. Family and business structures continue to evolve, and technology enables further changes in 
the way people live and work. Telecommuting, wireless technologies, and paging technologies free customers to 
live and work in ways that were impossible without these conveniences. Perceived usefulness, ease of use, social 
influences, wireless trust environment, and facilitating conditions are also affecting the acceptance of wireless 
Internet via mobiles (Lu, et al., 2005). Ultra-wideband (UWB) services are emerging (Templeton &  Schmidt, 
2005). These changes will alter the nature of telecommunications competition.     
 
 Technology convergence has driven the business lines of telecommunications companies to become blurred and 
now each company tries to figure out its new role in the telecommunications arena. Three basic truths govern the 
decisions that companies are making today to define themselves within the new business models (Shepard, 2002). 
The first of these is that access and transport are commodity products that can be bought from a variety of providers 
at ever-lower rates. Second, if access and transport companies want to continue to maintain an edge in their 
marketplace, they must change the services chain and become more than what they currently are. They must become 
full-service telecommunications providers because more and more often customers are looking for all services from 
a single provider. Customers want services, content, Internet, access, and more, all delivered properly and billed 
under a single invoice. There is a demand for mobile services not only from individuals but also from enterprises 
(Jain, 2005). Third, wireless access is creeping in, and the percentage of fixed wireless local loops is climbing 
steadily. The growth of mobile telephony has been phenomenal, so that mobile subscription will soon surpass that of 
fixed telephone lines. Mobile service providers can increase their revenues by increasing the number of their 
customers or/and the usage that existing customers make of their mobile devices (Peppard & Rylander, 2006). 
However, everyone in a developed country is a customer of a mobile operator. So, the way to go is to offer many 
mobile applications to the customers in order to increase their usage. These mobile applications would be developed 
by third-party companies. The mobile service providers may form alliances with such companies. They may even 
offer discounts to their customers when they buy products or services from their partnering companies (Son et al., 
2006). However, consumers’ willingness to pay for online services is likely to be influenced by their perceived value 
of convenience these services provide, and by the extent to which they utilize these services (Ye,  et al., 2004).  
 
According to a research conducted by Andersen Consulting (1999) three business strategies have emerged in the 
telecommunications arena: 
 
• dominate on one piece of the business: become a key player in one business sector, like Vodafone in the 
mobile sector, 
• cover all bases: compete in as many business sectors is possible and if there is somewhere lack of resources 
then form an alliance or outsource it, 
• become a “solution provider”: create a “bundle” of the best services and integrate the system without 
having physical infrastructure or assets and just switch business partners to suit the vagaries of the market 
place. 
 
No single company in the telecommunications industry today is capable of accomplishing this service reorientation 
on its own. Telecommunication companies need to participate in at least one alliance (Brenner, et al., 2005). They 
try to achieve economies of scale, to share infrastructure, resources, ‘know how’ and experiences, to increase their 
resources without investing, to harmonize their technology and pricing models (Sismanidis & Economides, 2007). 
During the last years, various mobile operators have cooperated to form mobile alliances: 
 
• Asia Mobility Initiative (AMI): Celcom (Malaysia), CSL (Hong Kong), CTM (Macau), DTAC 
(Thailand), Maxis (Malaysia), MobileOne (Singapore), Smart (Philippines), Telstra (Australia), TM Int. 
(Malaysia),  
• Asia-Pacific Mobile Alliance: Far East Tone Telecommunications Co (Taiwan), Hutchison Essar (India), 
Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong (Hong Kong and Macau), KT Freetel (Korea), NTT DoCoMo 
(Japan), PT Indosat (Indonesia) and StarHub (Singapore), 
• Bridge Mobile Alliance: Airtel (India), CSL (Hong Kong), CTM (Macau), Globe Telecom (Philippines), 
Maxis (Malaysia), SingTel Mobile (Singapore), SingTel Optus (Australia), SK Telecom (Korea), Taiwan 
Mobile (Taiwan), Telkomsel (Indonesia), 
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• Fixed-Mobile Convergence Alliance (FMCA): AT&T, Azimuth, Belgacom, Airtel, Brasil Telecom, 
Broadcom, BT, China Telecom, T-Com, eircom, Huawer, innove, Korea Telecom, Marvell, Maxis, NTT 
Communications, OPTUS, PCCW, Quiconnect, Rodgers Wireless, KPN, Swisscom, TDC Mobil, Telecom 
Italia, Telecom, Telia Sonera, True, 
• FreeMove: Orange (France, Netherlands, Spain, U.K.), TeliaSonera (Nordic and Baltics), TIM-Telecom 
Italia Mobile (Italy), T-Mobile (International),  
• I-mode: Base (Belgium), Bouygues Telecom (France), Cellcom (Israel), COSMOTE Mobile 
Telecommunication (Greece), E-Plus Mobilfunk (Germany), Far East Tone Telecommunications (Taiwan), 
KPN Mobile (Netherlands), mmO2 (Germany, Ireland, U.K.), MTS (Russia), NTT DoCoMo (Japan), 
Telefonica Moviles Espana (Spain), Telstra (Australia), Wind Telecomunicazioni (Italy),  
• Open Mobile Alliance (OMA):  
• Open Mobile Terminal Platform (OMTP): Cingular Wireless, Hutchison 3G, Orange (France, 
Netherlands, Spain, U.K.), SK Telecom, Telefonica Moviles Espana (Spain), TIM-Telecom Italia Mobile 
(Italy), Telenor (Norway and International), T-Mobile (Germany and International), Vodafone, 
• Starmap Mobile Alliance: Amena (Spain), Eurotel (Czech Republic), mmO2 (Germany, Ireland, U.K.), 
One (Austria), Pannon GSM (Hungary), SONOFON (Denmark), Sunrise (Switzerland), Telenor Mobile 
(Norway), Wind (Italy),  
• Vodafone Group Plc and Partner Network: in 33 countries, 
• Wireless Broadband Alliance (WBA): BT (U.K.), CNC (China), CSL (Hong Kong, DT, du (UAE), IM2 
(Indonesia), Korea Telecom, Maxis (Malaysia), NTTCom (Japan), Orange (France), PTWiFi (Portugal), 
SMART (Philippines), StarHub (Singapure), Swisscom Mobile, TAT-VSNL (India), Telecom Italia, 
Telefonica (Spain), Telmex (Mexico), True (Thailand), T-Mobile (International). 
 
Such alliances are motivated by the desire to achieve economies of scale without investing, to overcome technical 
problems such as interoperability, roaming (Curwen &  Whalley, 2005) and to provide their multinational enterprise 
customers with global services. There is even cooperation between alliances (FreeMove and Bridge Mobile 
Alliance, 27-3-2007). However, mobile operators form alliances with companies from other industries too. The 
convergence effect is forcing telecommunications, media, ISP’s (Internet Service Providers), content aggregators 
and computer industry firms to form cross-industry strategic alliances at such a frenetic pace that major new 
alliances are announced weekly. Some alliances fail due mostly to the mismatch of partner’s strategy (Duysters & 
Heimeriks, 2002), while others grow quickly, but all are aimed at building profitable parts of the new infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the rationale for alliance formation changes over time (Rice & Galvin, 2006) in response to changing 
legislation, competition, market, technology etc. Companies need to adapt their resources to these changing 
conditions. Their strategy is based on their resources. However, if they decide to change their strategy’s objectives 
they should also acquire the appropriate resources.  It is important to investigate how companies adjust their 
resources over time in response to environment’s changes. A fast way to accumulate resources is by forming 
alliances. For example, Vodafone Group Plc formed alliances aiming at continuously introducing new products and 
services that drive the full capacity usage of its voice and data infrastructure (Dodourova, 2003). Its inter-industry 
alliances aimed at securing resources to provide customers with a wide range of services. Its intra-industry alliances 
mainly aimed at geographical scope expansion. Also, 3Com Corporation entered into many domestic partnerships 
with large firms and many of these partnerships were repeated (Vivio, 2004). The majority of its alliances were in 
four categories: technology exchange, cooperative R&D, unidirectional licensing/marketing agreements, and 
customer-supplier relationships.  
 
This paper analyzes the alliances’ of two Greek mobile telephony companies. Since no single company has all the 
required resources to effectively compete in the changing environment, they should continuously form alliances to 
acquire the needed complementary resources.    
 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN MOBILE TELEPHONY IN GREECE 
 
In Greece, mobile telephony is considered to be a mature market with a variety of value added services and quite a 
strong competition. According to the Greek Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (2004), mobile 
telephony penetration rate is rather impressive; it reached 95% in the first semester of 2003 from 20% in 1998. 
Despite this, Greek users underutilize their handsets in comparison to the European average. This fact promises 
further profit growth in the future. Mobile companies believe that the 3G will receive high acceptance in the future. 
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Thus, technology evolution and new value added services will also create new sources of profit. Furthermore, the 
expected replacement of the wired telephony with the mobile telephony and the new innovative services (video, 
voice and photography) will shape a new market. 
 
Due to the convergence of mobile telephony with Internet, the domain of mobile telephony is considered to be a 
particular competitive part of the market.  During the last years, a growing number of alliances have been recorded. 
The companies that operate in the Greek mobile telephony sector are Cosmote, Vodafone Hellas, TIM and Q-
Telecom, with a total number of about 10 million subscribers.  
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Chart 1:  Total number of Greek mobile telephony subscribers.  
 
 
On March 2004, Cosmote held 37.95%, Vodafone Hellas 34.7%, TIM 23.06% and Q-Telecom held 4.28% of the 
total mobile telephony subscribers. During the first quarter of 2006, the subscriber marker share has been: Cosmote 
(37.4%), Vodafone Hellas (35.6%), TIM (19.5%) and Q-Telecom (7.5%). On June and October 2005, TIM and Q-
Telecom have been acquired by Apax Partners and Texas Pacific Group (TGP), companies which are not specialized 
in mobile telephony. In mobile telephony with a contract, Cosmote is the leader with 1,600,135 subscribers (44.34% 
share of mobile telephony with contract market). In mobile telephony with prepaid time calling cards, Vodafone is 
the leader with 2,512,041 subscribers (35.93% share of prepaid mobile telephony market). We should also notice 
here the strong and accelerating subscribers’ preference in using prepaid calling cards (66% of total subscribers), 
especially for young people, who need to control their budget.   
 
As there is a strong competition in the mobile telephony market and especially between Cosmote and Vodafone 
Hellas, it is rather interesting to see how Cosmote and Vodafone Hellas develop their alliance strategies, with which 
companies and what they have gained from these. We collected data about Cosmote (www.cosmote.gr) and 
Vodafone Hellas (www.vodafone.gr) from the companies’ websites, talks with the companies’ staff, media 
announcements about their co-operation and research papers. The search covered a five-year period (2000- 2004). 
We created a database to register the alliances’ characteristics (e.g. date, partners, partner’s industrial scope, 
partner’s nationality, alliance’s motives, partner’s resources). Then, we analyzed the data and created useful tables 
detailing the identified partnerships by: participating firms, purpose and motivation, resources contributed by the 
partners, general description of each participating company and date of the partnership. During our analysis, we 
found out that a critical point for both companies was the deployment of i-mode (June 2004) and Vodafone Live! 
(January, 2003) services. So, we distinguished the before and after periods.  Regarding Cosmote, we have the 
“before i-mode” period (January 2000-May 2004) and the “after i-mode” period (June 2004-December 2004). 
Regarding Vodafone Hellas, we have the “before Vodafone Live!” period (January 2000-December 2002) and the 
“after Vodafone Live!” period (January 2003-December 2004). 
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We classified the Vodafone’s and Cosmote’s motives for forming alliances based on the work by Harrigan (1988), 
Glaister and Buckler (1996), Lorange and Roos (1997), Doz and Hamel (1998), and Spekman, Isabella and 
MacAvoy (1999). We distinguished the following motives:  
 
• Market-related motives. Gain access to new market segments, or to new geographical areas that are 
protected by national tariff and other barriers. Avoid controls on importation, and overcome barriers to 
commercial penetration. Experiment with new markets and defend/enhance market position in present 
markets. 
• Product-related motives. Create and experimenting with new products, add value to existing ones, 
differentiate/enter new product domains.  
• Technology-related motives. Fill critical technology gaps, set new global standards, experiment and gain 
access to technology.  
• Risk reduction-related motives. Share risk in case of large R&D costs, reduce technological/market 
uncertainty.  
• Competencies and skills-related motives. Access skills or capabilities faster and at a lower cost than 
internal development permits, learn new skills or enhance present skills. 
• Cost-related motives. Share R&D, manufacturing, marketing and organizational costs, achieve economies 
of scale. 
• Industry and market structure modification-related motives. Raise entry barriers, and change the 
technological base of competition. 
• Timing-related motives. Exploit new product or market or new technology faster from competitors. 
 
Cosmote 
 
Cosmote is a mobile company subsidiary of OTE. It started its commercial operation in 1998, five years later than 
its competitors using GSM1800 technology in contrast to GSM900 of the other operators. It has experienced an 
impressive subscriber base growth, gaining one in every two new subscribers in the Greek market and securing the 
lowest churn rate. Currently, it has a market share of about 37.5% and is considered to be the most successful third 
entrant in the European Market. According to its financial results reported at the end of the 3rd quarter of 2004, 
revenues for the 9th month period reached 1,116.1 million euro, contract customers were 1,610,032, while prepaid 
customers reached 2,481,141, giving a total number of 4,091,173 customers. Also, Cosmote successfully deployed a 
high-quality cellular network GSM 1800 during the Athens 2004 Olympic Games (Sergiadis, 2005). 
 
Cosmote’s financial achievements, reliable telecommunications network with over 2600 stations, new technologies 
successful implementation and management drove it into the first position of the Greek mobile telephony 
companies. For this reason, “The Banker” (the magazine of Financial Times) honored Cosmote the title of the 
“Company of the year 2003” in Greece. As Cosmote continues its successful route, it moves towards impressive 
deals with foreign leaders (NTTDoCoMo) aiming to further development and more revenues. Additionally, its 
strategic presence in other Balkan countries through its subsidiary AMC in Albany, Globul in Bulgaria and 
COSMOFON in Fyrom shows Cosmote’s strong will for geographic expansion. Cosmote also cooperated with 
global leader COMMERCE ONE for the formation of cosmoONE, an e-commerce, business to business, company. 
 
Cosmote introduced i-mode service into the Greek market on June 7th, 2004, after an exclusive strategic partnership 
agreement with Japan’s leading mobile communications provider, NTTDoCoMo. This was the eighth alliance of 
NTTDoCoMo i-mode. I-mode’s success factors include the low fees for data and content, the provision of content 
from many companies (other than the mobile operator), the provision of entertainment services, and the high 
revenues shares for content providers (Weber and Winger, 2006). Although NTTDoCoMo believed that mobile 
banking will be a killer application, it encouraged content providers to offer their content and applications via i-
mode (Haas, 2007). The higher demand by users for a given content or application positioned it higher on the menu 
of i–mode. So, the customers decided upon the fate of a content provider. Future 3G services would include news, 
entertainment, and traveling services (e.g. checking schedules, traffic reports, reservations, ticketing) (Karjaluoto, 
2006). 
 
For the needs of this study, we created extensive Charts for the “before i-mode” and “after i-mode” periods. These 
Charts present Cosmote partners, the partners’ specialization, the alliances’ motives, the alliances’ purposes, and 
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finally the contributed resources. The partners were further identified and the alliances were classified as either 
intra-industry (telecommunications companies) or inter-industry (equipment manufacturers, content aggregators, 
computers and software, media, ISP’s etc.) alliances. The next Chart 2 shows the classification of Cosmote’s 
alliance partners in the two periods according to the partners’ industrial sectors.  
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Chart 2:  Classification of Cosmote’s alliance partners according to their industrial scope. 
 
Chart 2 shows that Cosmote formed 36 alliances with 43 companies in the “before i-mode” period, and 149 alliances 
with 151 companies in the “after i-mode” period. Most of its partners are from other complementary industrial 
sectors. Thus, Cosmote is trying to enhance its presence in other technological domains and markets and get 
competitive advantage.  
 
Since spring 2004, Cosmote’s alliances are concentrated on the successful deployment of i-mode, and in the 
enrichment of the provided content. In the “after i-mode” period, the striking majority of its alliances are formed 
with content aggregators and media companies which provide rich content. So, Cosmote wanted to offer plenty of 
content and applications via i-mode in order its customers increase the usage of its network and its services. So, its 
customers would pay larger usage bills and spend extra money on the offered services. Thus, Cosmote would 
increase its revenues due to higher bills, advertisements on i-mode, and revenue shares from its partner companies.  
 
       Chart 3 shows the nationality of Cosmote’s partners. 
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Chart 3:  Classification of Cosmote’s alliance partners according to their nationality. 
 
 
 During the “before i-mode” period, 25 out of 43 Cosmote’s partners have been Greek companies. During the “after 
i-mode” period, 114 out of 151 Cosmote’s partners have been Greek companies. Thus, there is a significant shift 
towards Greek companies.  
 
In both periods, the ISPs (Internet Service Providers) are Greek companies. On the contrary, the equipment 
manufacturers (Nokia, Ericcson etc.) who provide Cosmote the customized handsets and equipment are always from 
other countries since there are not Greek companies with appropriate know-how and technology. Finally, due to the 
Internet penetration in the last years, more and more content aggregators and media companies were formed and 
they provided to Cosmote rich content. During the “after i-mode” period, there has been an explosion of alliances 
with Greek content aggregators and media companies in order to provide to Cosmote’s customers with a variety of 
Greek content and applications. Almost all of Cosmote’s customers speak the Greek language and have the Greek 
culture. So, the majority of the content and applications that is offered via i-mode should be in the Greek language 
and tailored to the Greek culture. So, Greek content aggregators and media companies are the most appropriate to 
provide such content and applications.  
 
Chart 4 shows the collaborative motives that shaped Cosmote’s strategic profile. 
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Chart 4:  Cosmote’s alliance formation motives.  
 
The results are cumulative since in most alliances the motives for alliance formation were more than one. In both 
periods, product related motives seem to surpass the others. Cosmote is much interested in innovating, introducing 
new products (MyCosmos, i-mode), and adding continuously value to them. The market related motives follow, 
which shows that Cosmote is active in gaining access to new markets and also enhancing its market position. 
Cosmote’s alliances with content aggregators and media companies are mainly based on product and market related 
motives, while its relationships with computer and software companies and equipment manufacturers are product 
and technology motivated. Finally, its relationships with intra-industry companies have to do with enhancing skills 
and competencies and with motives related with market enhancement. During the “after i-mode” period, Cosmote’s 
main motives have concerned product and market. So, Cosmote wanted to experiment with new products, add value 
to existing ones, gain access to new markets segments and enhance its market position in present markets.  
 
Chart 5 shows that the highest priority Cosmote’s alliances for resources are for content and market share. 
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Chart 5:  Highest priority resources of Cosmote according to its partnerships.  
 
 
Cosmote seeks intra-industry alliances that provide complementary networks in order to offer better services and 
expertise in wireless internet. Also, Cosmote collaborates with content aggregators and media companies in order to 
obtain rich content and market share. Equipment manufactures and computer and software companies contribute 
with their technology and experience, while ISPs provide their valuable internet-related experience and technology. 
Finally, Cosmote seeks content and experience from the rest alliances. During the “after i-mode” period, Cosmote 
clearly has been looking for partners with rich content and market share. So, Cosmote wanted to form alliances in 
order to increase its market share and its content on i-mode. Increasing its market share would give it competitive 
advantage. Increasing the content on i-mode would cause increased communications usage and purchases via i-mode 
by its customers resulting to increased revenues for Cosmote.   
 
Concluding Cosmote’s alliances are both strategic and cost economizing. They are strategic because it enters into 
the new market of mobile Internet. They are cost economizing because it enters the international alliance of i-mode 
acquiring technology at reduced cost.   
  
Vodafone Hellas 
 
On July 1993, a consortium constituted by Vodafone Group Plc, France Telecom, Intracom and Data Bank started 
the commercial operation of Panafon. On January 2002, it changed its brand name to Vodafone Hellas. Today its 
main shareholder is Vodafone Group Plc with 99.381%, the world leader of mobile telephony with presence in 28 
countries. Vodafone Hellas might be considered as the biggest private investment in Greece with a total number of 
1,67 billion euro of investments since its beginning. 
 
According to its financial results reported for the financial year ending on 31st  of March 2004 (1/4/2003-31/3/2004), 
its revenues reached 1,473.6 million euro, net income rose to 235.4 million, while the total customer base was 
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3,678,208. Vodafone Hellas was the first Greek company to be awarded the “Achievement in Excellence” from the 
European Foundation for Quality Management in 2001. 
 
Its high quality network coverage in conjunction with the extended retail chain network of Vodafone Shops has 
contributed significantly towards Vodafone Hellas success. Its strategic decisions led it also successfully to the 
Albanian market through its subsidiary Vodafone Albania. 
 
Its strategic goal is the provision of high quality services of mobile communication to the Greek public offering 
services both for prepay and post pay users. It was the first to launch in the Greek market advanced services, such as 
Vodafone live! and Vodafone Mobile Connect Card for corporate users.  
 
Launched on January 2003, Vodafone Live! was the first mobile service that integrated handsets, networks, content 
and services in order to produce an end to end, easy to use customer solution. Since then, all Vodafone’s efforts have 
been concentrated in the enrichment of Vodafone Live!’s content and in providing to its customers plenty of 
services.  
 
We created various Charts describing the Vodafone Hellas alliances during the “before Vodafone Live!” and “after 
Vodafone Live!” periods. These Charts present its partners, the partners’ specialization, the motives underlying the 
alliances, the purposes of these alliances and finally the contributed resources. Chart 6 shows the classification of its 
alliance partners in the two periods according to their industrial sectors.  
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Chart 6:  Classification of Vodafone’s partners according to their industrial scope.  
 
In the “before Vodafone Live!” period, Vodafone Hellas formed 25 alliances with 30 companies. In the “after 
Vodafone Live!” period, it formed 118 alliances with 122 companies. So, it over quadruple its alliances after the 
Vodafone Live! launching. 
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Since January 2003, most Vodafone Hellas’s alliances are content aggregators and media companies. It aims to 
enrich the content of Vodafone Live! with a variety of areas such as entertainment, ringtones, wallpapers, games etc. 
So, it formed many alliances with content aggregators and media companies in order to offer to their customers 
plenty of applications via Vodafone Live!.  So, Vodafone Hellas wanted to offer plenty of content and applications 
via Vodafone Live! in order its customers increase the usage of its network and its services. So, its customers would 
pay larger usage bills and spend extra money on the offered services. Thus, Vodafone Hellas would increase its 
revenues due to higher bills, advertisements on i-mode, and revenue shares from its partner companies.  
 
Also, it allied with computer and software companies to support e-commerce and Internet applications. It has 
formed only one alliance with an equipment manufacturer, Ericsson, in the “after Vodafone Live!” period. However, 
Vodafone Group Plc (instead of Vodafone Hellas) has formed many such alliances, providing Vodafone Hellas with 
great economies of scale. 
 
Taking into account the nationality of Vodafone Hellas partners, 19 out of 25 alliances were with Greek companies 
during the “before Vodafone Live!” period. During the “after Vodafone Live!” period, most of its alliances have 
been  Greek companies belonging to different industrial sectors. 
 
The next Chart 7 shows the collaborative motives that had shaped Vodafone’s strategic profile in both periods: 
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Chart 7:  Vodafone’s alliance formation motives.  
 
Product and market related motives dominate over all other motives. Vodafone Hellas is much interested in creating 
new products, and making the existing ones better. It is also enhancing its market position and is using interesting 
and up-to-date content in order to seduce new subscribers. A major advantage is its relationship with its mother 
company Vodafone Group Plc. Vodafone Hellas is getting access to the most worldwide innovative and 
sophisticated products, technologies and services and simultaneously is achieving great economies of scale. During 
the “after Vodafone Live!” period, the main alliances’ motives of Vodafone Hellas have concerned product and 
market. So, Vodafone Hellas wanted to experiment with new products, add value to existing ones, gain access to 
new markets segments and enhance its market position in present markets.  
 
Chart 8 shows which resources are of highest priority for Vodafone Hellas according to its partnership. 
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Chart 8:  Highest priority resources of Vodafone according to its partnerships. 
 
Content and market enhancement seem to be of the highest priority. Vodafone Hellas also seeks complementary 
networks for providing better services and market share from its intra-industry alliances. Finally, it seeks mainly rich 
content and market share from its collaborations with inter-industry companies. During the “after Vodafone Live!” 
period, Vodafone Hellas clearly has been looking for partners with rich content and market share. So, Vodafone 
Hells wanted to form alliances in order to increase its market share and its content on i-mode. Increasing its market 
share would give it competitive advantage. Increasing the content on i-mode would cause increased communications 
usage and purchases via i-mode by its customers resulting to increased revenues for Vodafone Hellas.  
  
Vodafone Hellas alliances are both strategic and cost economizing. They are strategic because they enable Vodafone 
to introduce advanced mobile and Internet services. They are cost economizing because of the synergies that it gets 
from Vodafone Group Plc’s alliances (brand name, customized and cheaper handsets and content, advanced 
technology). Its collaborative relationships show that the company is stretching beyond its core business and is 
becoming a mobile multimedia company. All Vodafone Hellas steps are well designed and they are part of the 
Vodafone Group’s global strategy. 
 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN COSMOTE AND VODAFONE HELLAS 
 
Both companies over quadrupled their alliances after launching i-mode and Vodafone Live!. Currently, their main 
alliance strategies motives are product and market related (Chart 9). They try to add value to their innovative 
products and they enter into new product domains in order to grow their subscriber base. Their major motive for 
their collaborations seems to be their customers’ provision with a wide range of services. This would increase their 
customers’ satisfaction and spending. Customers want a variety of content and applications (Peppard &Rylander, 
2006; Haas, 2007). So, if the customers find a lot of content and applications, they will be happy to stay with this 
mobile operator and spend their money there.  
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Chart 9:  Cosmote’s and Vodafone’s alliance formation motives. 
 
 
The resources contributed by their partners are mainly content and market enhancement (Chart 10). These 
collaborations provide Vodafone and Cosmote with customized wireless content: news, sport, entertainment and 
other services via multimedia applications for mobile phone users. The provision of such services via mobile phone 
is a totally new market opportunity which is expected to become highly valued in the next years. 
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Chart 10:  Cosmote’s and Vodafone’s partners contributed resources. 
 
 The majority of their alliances are customer supplier relationships, which have a lower level of interdependence and 
are close to the market. The industrial scopes of the majority of their partners do not belong to the 
telecommunications (Chart 11). Most of the partners are content aggregators and media companies. Both Vodafone 
Hellas and Cosmote try to enhance their market share and exploit the convergence of Internet, mobile telephony and 
personal computing. In order to achieve this, they seek to leverage their existing capabilities by collaborating with 
complementary partners. As long as the profits from transporting voice are falling, both companies try to increase 
their customer traffic by offering to their subscribers a variety of value added services. They stretch their market 
boundaries and turn to collaborations with new emergent market segments related to future growth.  
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Chart 11:  Classification of Vodafone’s and Cosmote’s alliance partners. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Only a few years ago strategic alliances in the telecommunications sector were considered to be an option reserved 
only for corporate giants. Today, however, for many companies, a go-it-alone strategy no longer seems to be a 
viable solution.  Intensified foreign competition, rapid product obsolescence, globalization, soaring capital 
investment costs, and the ever-growing demand for new technologies make alliances a really attractive strategy for 
the future. Companies can select, build, and deploy the critical capabilities that will enable them to gain competitive 
advantage, enhance customer value, and drive markets (Harbison, 1998). Their goal is to focus on the capabilities 
that they can use to renew their positions constantly. Furthermore, there is a strong need for each mobile company of 
joining an international alliance or belonging directly to an international big company in order to gain access to their 
valuable and constantly renewable resources, achieving simultaneously great economies of scale. 
 
The technology evolution (from 2G to 2.5G or to 3G) as well as the convergence of mobile telephony with 
computing and Internet drastically increased the number of alliances. Mobile telephony is transformed into a domain 
of provision of integrated mobile communication services and multimedia applications. No single company in the 
mobile telecommunications industry is capable of accomplishing the service reorientation on its own. In order to 
survive, it pools resources with other players and creates the combination of strengths and abilities desired by the 
customer base. Most alliance partners of a mobile company belong to different and complementary industrial 
sectors. Content providers, media, software companies, wireless-service providers, and equipment and device 
manufacturers have to work together with the mobile operators in order to create a seamless and complete wireless 
data service.  
 
Mobile telephony is changing from an industry that was all about voice to one that is mostly about data. The value 
of a mobile operator is not just on its network and infrastructure but also on the content and applications that it 
provides (Peppard & Rylander, 2006). Taking into account the consumers’ and enterprises’ needs for wireless 
Internet services and to keep growing, wireless communications companies have to turn to data services, counting 
on consumers’ and enterprises’ hunger for wireless Internet services (Lu, et al., 2005; Jain, 2005). As there is a 
strong belief that in the next years all the growth in telecommunications will come from data traffic, most business 
to consumer Internet services would finally be sold over mobile phones. Co-promotion alliances with companies in 
different industries cab benefit all partners (Son, et al., 2006).  Customers want a wide variety of content and 
applications (Peppard & Rylander, 2006; Haas, 2007). Diversity of content and applications, low prices for 
customers and attractive revenue shares with allies are important issues for successful mobile operators. In fact, 
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content providers may earn a large share of the charges collected by the mobile operators. For example, DoCoMo 
kept about 10%, Vodafone Europe kept about 50% of the profits (Weber & Winger, 2006; Peppard & Rylander, 
2006; Haas, 2007). So, mobile operators in order to ensure further profiting, they become really active alliance 
players and form relationships which help them to improve or develop new capabilities, extend their boundaries and 
ensure control over critical resources. Currently, the mobile operators control the content provisioning market. In the 
future, it is possible that all players (mobile carriers, device manufacturers, content integrators, content providers 
and users) will actively participate and exchange roles in negotiating their resources and abilities (Ziv, 2005). 
 
Future research would repeat this study in other countries. Furthermore, a cross-country comparison would identify 
whether the corresponding mobile operators follow the same strategy in forming alliances. The successes and 
failures of such alliances would be also investigated. Furthermore, future research would try to answer the following 
questions: What is the best alliances’ structure and control?  Is there an optimum number of partners in an alliance? 
Is there an optimum lifetime of an alliance? What are the success factors for effective alliances? What types of 
partners are the most attractive? What types of partners are essential for growth? What types of partners are the most 
promising for profit? What will be the killer applications? For what applications there are not cultural differences?  
 
Future research would investigate the various sub-categories of the content aggregators and media companies in 
order to discover which specific types of companies are the most appealing candidates to form alliances. For 
example, it is possible that companies offering location-based, presence-based, entertainment and tourism 
applications would be attractive candidates. Furthermore, raw data would be collected from consumers about their 
preferences regarding the applications of i-mode and Vodafone Live!. So, these data would indicate the direction to 
look for alliances by the mobile operators.  
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